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Do Fishermen Have Different Attitudes 
Toward Risk? An Application of Prospect 
Theory to the Study of Vietnamese Fishermen 
 
Quang Nguyen and PingSun Leung 
 
Field experiment and household survey data are combined to investigate whether working 
in a risky occupation such as fishing makes fishermen have different risk preferences 
than individuals in other occupations. Prospect theory is utilized as the main analytical 
framework and a structural model approach is developed to simultaneously correlate the 
parameters of the utility function under prospect theory with other socioeconomic vari-
ables. The key finding is that working in fishing makes economic agents less risk averse 
than others. Fishermen also tend to be less sensitive to probability weighting changes in 
the experiment. It is possible that fishermen have adapted to their unique environment by 
using specific heuristics for decision making under conditions of uncertainty. 
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Introduction 
 
Fishing exhibits a distinguishable risk pattern from other professions. It is widely agreed that 
fishermen’s risk preference is a major determinant of their responses to various changes in 
fishing stock, market, and weather conditions (Mistiaen and Strand, 2000). Therefore, 
understanding fishermen’s risk preference is a key aspect of modeling and analyzing their 
decision-making behavior. The standard method of studying risk behavior is to estimate the 
parameter representing the concavity of the utility function under the expected utility 
framework. The more concave the utility function, the more risk averse is the agent. This 
traditional approach, however, lacks an important element: loss aversion. Such an aspect of 
risk behavior is of great relevance to the fishing occupation, in which receiving a negative 
profit for a fishing trip is not uncommon. 
 In this paper we apply prospect theory as an alternative framework to expected utility theory 
in order to study the risk behavior of fishermen. To our knowledge, only one other study 
has applied a similar framework in the fishery economics literature (Nguyen and Leung, 2008). 
The authors found that the target revenue model, a version of prospect theory, can explain 
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decision-making behavior on trip length for a majority of Hawaii’s longline fishermen. Prospect 
theory enables us to integrate the loss aversion aspect into risk behavior analysis. Since prospect 
theory gives a more comprehensive description of risk preferences, we are able to capture some 
insights that may otherwise be missed by using only the expected utility framework. 
 The specific objective of this study is to answer the question: Do fishermen exhibit 
different risk behavior from workers in other professions? This paper makes a contribution to 
the field of economics in several ways. First, it introduces the idea of combining experimental 
data and household survey data. The combination is made by matching information collected 
under a controlled environment (i.e., the field experiment) with information collected in a 
natural environment (i.e., the household survey). This combination allows us to make optimal 
use of both data sets. Data quality from the field experiment is enhanced since it is collected 
in a highly controlled environment. Furthermore, data from the experiments provide us with 
behavioral information that is not available in traditional household survey data, while data 
from the household survey offer a number of socioeconomic variables that can be used to 
explain risk behavior. Our study’s second contribution is that we are able to investigate the 
causal relationship between working in fishing and risk behavior. As discussed below, the 
unique characteristics of Vietnam’s fishing industry make this contribution possible by over-
coming potential endogeneity of occupational choice in the risk behavior equation employed 
in other studies. 
 We believe this paper represents the first study to focus on risk preferences of fishermen in 
fishing villages in developing countries. These villagers are not only engaged in subsistence 
fishing (fishing for personal or family consumption), but also in small-scale commercial 
fishing. Working as fishermen under such circumstances involves risks associated with both 
income and other uncontrollable factors such as weather conditions. We are particularly inter-
ested in how the working environment may affect the risk behavior of these fishermen. 
 In terms of empirical strategy, we develop a structural model approach to correlate param-
eters of the utility function under prospect theory with other socioeconomic variables. To our 
knowledge, only one previous study (Andersen et al., 2008) has employed the same approach 
as ours. This paper extends the work of Andersen et al. by partially addressing the causal 
relationship between risk preferences and occupation. Further, by integrating a national 
household living standard survey into the field experiment, we have more control variables in 
the econometric models which largely help in dealing with omitted variables bias. 
 The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section discusses relevant litera- 
ture on fishermen’s behavior. Special attention is given to studies using experimental methods. 
Next, we elaborate on the data and methodology used in this study. In this section, we also 
discuss the method of simultaneously estimating parameters of the utility function under 
prospect theory. A section is then devoted to our major findings and their interpretations. The 
final section presents concluding remarks and offers potential extensions of this research. 
 
Literature Review and Discussion of Prospect Theory 
Sutinen’s (1979) paper is one of the early studies to specifically integrate the role of risk 
preferences in fishermen’s decision-making behavior. In his study of remuneration practice in 
fishing, Sutinen assumes fishermen exhibit risk-averse behavior, just like people in other 
occupations. Since publication of his work, it basically has been taken for granted that 
fishermen are risk averse; most empirical evidence on fishermen’s risk behavior appears to 
support that hypothesis. For instance, using the random parameter logit (RPL) framework to 
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study location choice in North Atlantic multiple species fishing, Mistiaen and Strand (2000) 
found that 95% of fishermen are risk averse. 
 Only a few studies report results differing from Sutinen’s assumption that fishermen are 
risk averse. For example, Bockstael and Opaluch (1983) were the first to test risk preferences 
empirically, and they could not reject the assumption that fishermen are risk averse. Using a 
similar methodology, Dupont (1993) rejected risk aversion in three of four fisheries, but 
actually drew the wrong inference that fishermen are risk preferring (see Mistiaen and Strand, 
2000). Revealed preference data were used by Eggert and Tveterås (2004), who found that a 
substantial number of fishermen in Sweden are not risk averse. Also, McConnell and Price 
(2006) argued that risk neutrality is common among fishermen. 
 Most of the above studies are based on the expected utility theory framework, using data 
from either surveys or logbooks. Instead of making initial assumptions or deriving general 
conclusions about risk behavior as was done in those studies, here we directly measure the 
level of risk aversion. In particular, we are interested in parameterizing the level of risk aver-
sion under the prospect theory framework using data from field experiments. The benefit of 
field experiments, as Falk and Fehr (2003) pointed out, is that it enables the researchers to 
generate truly exogenous variation in the data that would otherwise be unavailable in natural 
or empirical data. Also, random assignment of participants by hand-picking may help in 
reducing selection bias and problems with omitted variables. 
 Eggert and Martinsson (2004) conducted one of the first experimental studies on fisher-
men’s risk behavior. In their investigation, risk preferences of Swedish commercial fishermen 
were estimated using data from a stated preference experiment. Stated preference methods are 
the broad class of hypothetical data collection methods (as opposed to revealed preference 
methods) which include contingent valuation, rankings, conjoint, and choice experiments 
(sometimes called stated choice). The participants were asked to choose between pairs of 
fishing trips characterized by the mean and spread of net revenue. Risk is measured by the 
spread of the net revenue and is assumed to follow a uniform distribution to make it easier for 
the experiment participants to make a choice (Johansson-Stenman, Carlsson, and Daruvala, 
2002). 
 Eggert and Martinsson (2004) found that 87% of the respondents in their study were not 
risk neutral. In contrast, Rabin (2000) noted that expected utility theory predicts people will 
be virtually risk neutral not only over modest stakes, but also for quite sizable and econom-
ically important stakes. Accordingly, we can infer that almost 90% of the experiment partici-
pants in the Eggert and Martinsson study did not behave according to expected utility theory. 
Eggert and Martinsson also reported that 48% of the fishermen can be broadly characterized 
as risk neutral and risk preferring, with 26% modestly risk averse, while 26% are strongly risk 
averse. 
 As pointed out by Eggert and Lokina (2007), despite a growing interest in examining 
fishermen’s risk preferences, most studies involve commercial fisheries. To check the robust-
ness of the results, Eggert and Lokina, following a similar approach, investigated the risk 
preferences of artisanal fishermen in Tanzania. They report that about 53% of Tanzanian 
fishermen can be considered broadly as risk preferring or risk neutral, 25% as modestly risk 
averse, and about 22% as strongly risk averse. Approximately 19% of fishermen in their 
sample behaved as expected return maximizers. According to Eggert and Lokina, this finding 
represents a marked difference from those in other commercial fisheries in which most fisher-
men are found to be risk averse.  
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 The studies by Eggert and Martinsson (2004) and Eggert and Lokina (2007) assert that 
expected utility theory may be appropriate in describing risk behavior regarding long-term 
decisions or decisions involving a large amount of money, such as purchasing a new boat in 
which lifetime wealth has to be properly taken into account. Yet, most decisions made in the 
fishing industry consider more immediate horizons. More importantly, as noted by Eggert and 
Martinsson, loss aversion may explain why only a small proportion of the fishermen in their 
study exhibit risk-averse behavior. This aspect of loss aversion, however, is absent under the 
expected utility theory framework. Accordingly, it is worth exploring fishermen’s risk 
behavior from an alternative model that incorporates broader aspects of risk behavior. As 
discussed below, prospect theory has increasingly proven to offer a better description of risk 
preferences under a wide range of applications. A particular advantage of using prospect 
theory is that it allows us to integrate the loss aspect (negative profit) into the model. This 
feature is of great relevance to fishing where experiencing a net loss for fishing trips due to 
uncontrollable factors, such as changes in weather conditions, is not uncommon. 
 
A Discussion of Prospect Theory 
 
Expected utility theory has long been the standard approach in economic modeling. Due to its 
limitations, several alternatives to expected utility theory have been advanced. Most notable is 
prospect theory, first introduced by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky in 1979. The key 
difference between prospect theory and expected utility is that the former integrates the loss 
aversion aspect of risk behavior into the utility function. Utility is measured based on a 
comparison of the realized income and the reference income. If the difference is positive, the 
economic agent receives a gain in utility, and vice versa. The basic premise is that people may 
be simultaneously risk averse to gain and risk preferring to loss. This new aspect of loss 
aversion has enabled prospect theory to explain a wide variety of economic phenomena that 
were considered puzzles from the expected utility perspective. Examples include the equity 
premium puzzle of Benartzi and Thaler (1995), as well as the status quo bias and endowment 
effect anomalies assessed by Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1991). 
 In connection with fishing, prospect theory is appealing for a number of reasons. Nguyen 
and Leung (2008) found that the target revenue model, a version of prospect theory, can 
explain decision-making behavior on trip length for a majority of Hawaii’s longline fisher-
men. Also, suffering a net loss in profit for a fishing trip is not an unusual occurrence in 
fishing. Therefore, the loss aversion aspect is particularly relevant in fishing studies. 
 
A Brief Introduction to 
Vietnam’s Fishing Sector and Fishermen 
 
Endowed with long coastlines and many rivers, Vietnam has a great potential for fishing 
development. “Com and Ca,” which can be translated into English as “Rice and Fish,” has 
been an important element of food consumption among Vietnamese for many centuries. 
According to recent statistics, the per capita annual consumption of fishing products was 13 
kg in 2001 (Vietnam Association of Seafood Exporters and Producers, 2001). Fishing can be 
classified into two main categories: freshwater and ocean fishing. The former includes fishing 
in rivers, lakes, and ponds. In 2002, there were about 550,000 fishermen in Vietnam, of 
whom 450,000 were ocean fishermen and 100,000 were freshwater fishermen (Nguyen, 2002).
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Freshwater fishing, characterized by simple boats and rudimentary equipment, requires much 
less financing compared to ocean fishing, generally with more advanced and expensive boats. 
In addition to fishing, most fishermen are involved in farming or aquaculture activities to earn 
additional income for their families (Nguyen, 2002). 
 A typical characteristic of Vietnamese fishermen is a strong sense of community. The 
fishing village is an integral element of the fishermen’s lifestyle. Adult males in fishing 
villages are fishermen, and fishing is expected to be the main occupation of men in the 
village. Consequently, men in a fishing village have little occupational freedom, regardless of 
their individual risk behavior. This feature plays a key role in the subsequent regression 
analyses in which we can safely infer a causal relationship between the occupation of fishing 
and risk behavior. 
 
Data and Methodology 
 
A noteworthy aspect of this study is the combination of experimental and household survey 
data. Tanaka, Camerer, and Nguyen (forthcoming) use the same set of data to study risk and 
time preferences. The main difference between that study and ours is that we apply a 
structural model approach in the estimation. Also, we pay particular attention to studying 
fishermen’s risk preferences. (Further detail of the data is reported in Tanaka, Camerer, and 
Nguyen.) In what follows, we describe the key components of the data and experimental 
design. 
 The baseline information is compiled from the 2002 Vietnam Household Living Standard 
Survey (VNLSS), which covers a total of 75,000 households in Vietnam. The survey provides 
key information on socioeconomic characteristics of Vietnamese households and individuals. 
The sample was designed in such a way that each household had the same probability of 
being selected. In the 2002 survey, 25 households1 were interviewed in each of 142 and 137 
rural villages in the Mekong Delta (in the South) and the Red River Delta (in the North, 
excluding villages in Hanoi City), respectively. Experiments were conducted in July and 
August of 2005, with the same members of households previously interviewed during the 
VNLSS 2002 survey. In particular, we chose nine villages—five villages in the south and four 
villages in the north—with substantial differences in mean income, inequality, and market 
access to permit statistically significant cross-village comparisons. The map in figure 1 shows 
the locations of these research sites. We then combined the data using ID numbers of 
individuals who participated in both the experimental and the VNLSS 2002 household survey 
as the linking variable. 
 In addition to its obvious advantages, the use of household survey data in combination with 
experimental data also calls for some caution. The experimental data from the participant’s 
decision-making behavior were collected under a different hypothetical context. The house-
hold data observe how people make decisions in a real-world context and, more precisely, the 
outcomes of their decisions. We must consider whether there is consistency in the 
participant’s behavior under these two different contexts. It may be argued that the subjects 
are less serious under experimental conditions compared to a real-world scenario, especially 
when the subject’s reward is relatively small. Fortunately, participants in our experiment 
could receive rewards of  up to several days of salary for reasonably made decisions; hence,
                                                 
1 Some households had moved during the 2002–2005 period. Accordingly, the number of participants may be fewer than 25 in 
some experimental sites. 
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they had a strong incentive to make their decisions thoughtfully and carefully (Tanaka, Cam-
erer, and Nguyen, forthcoming). 
 Another argument against the use of experimental data is based on the notion that the same 
person may behave differently under different circumstances. For instance, a fisherman may 
be risk preferring when he is fishing; however, he may be risk averse when making a house-
hold investment decision. Yet, in a large study on risk behavior in Europe, Dohmen et al. 
(forthcoming) found that people show consistent risk behavior under different decision-
making scenarios such as vehicle driving, financial matters, health, and career. This finding 
supports the use of experimental data in our study. 
 Concerning the theoretical framework of this study, we assume economic agents’ behavior 
is elicited by prospect theory. As noted earlier, expected utility theory is a special case of 
prospect theory. Accordingly, we could uncover additional findings that might otherwise be 
obscured when simply applying expected utility theory. Here, we use cumulative prospect 
theory2 (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) and the one-parameter 
form of Prelec’s (1998) axiomatically derived weighting function. Specifically, the utility 
function under prospect theory can be expressed as follows: 
 
(1)                                    ( , ; ) ( ) (1 ) ( ),PT x y p pv x p v y    
where  
                                                 
2 For a discussion on the application of cumulative prospect theory to natural resources, the interested reader is referred to Shaw 
and Woodward (2008). 
Figure 1. Locations of experimental sites 
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  ( ) exp[ ( ln ) ].w p p
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PT(x, y; p) is the expected prospect value over binary prospects consisting of the outcome 
(x, y) with the corresponding probability (p, 1 − p). In our experiment, (x, y; p) is specified for 
option A and option B in all scenarios. Note that the value function v(x) should be examined 
with x for x > 0 or –λ(−x) for x < 0. The parameter  represents concavity of the value 
function (risk aversion),  represents the degree of loss aversion, and γ is a proxy for the 
probability weighting. The three parameters , , and γ were estimated using data from the 
field experiment conducted in Vietnam during the summer of 2005. The experiment aims at 
measuring social preference, time discounting, risk preference, and, most importantly, risk 
behavior among Vietnamese villagers. 
 The experimental design is presented in the appendix. Each experimental subject (partici-
pant) was asked to make decisions in choosing between option A and option B under different 
scenarios. Each scenario is characterized by monetary rewards and the corresponding proba-
bilities of receiving those rewards. After all participants in the experiment had completed 
making decisions, a scenario was randomly selected to decide how much the participants 
would receive from the experiment. On average, the participant earned 21,431 VND, which is 
equivalent to $1.3 US. 
 To estimate the parameters , , and γ of the utility function for each individual, we 
generate 35 scenarios. These scenarios are divided into three subcomponents. The first two 
subcomponents aim at measuring the risk-aversion parameter . The third subcomponent 
focuses on estimating the loss-aversion parameter . 
 It is important to note that the highly nonlinear nature of the utility function under prospect 
theory makes the estimation procedure relatively difficult to handle. A number of procedures 
have been developed to estimate parameters of the utility function under prospect theory. 
However, these procedures focus only on estimating elements of the utility function 
separately. For instance, to estimate parameters of the weighting function, Wu and Gonzalez 
(1996) developed the least-squares method for minimizing the actual and estimated proba-
bility of choosing one prospect over the other. Abdellaoui (2000) and Abdellaoui, Bleichrodt, 
and Paraschiv (2007) developed a two-stage procedure to estimate the weighting function and 
loss-aversion coefficients. In this paper, we applied an empirical strategy allowing for 
simultaneous estimation of the three parameters of the utility function under prospect theory 
as well as the correlation of these parameters with other socioeconomic variables. Table 1 
provides a list of our study’s socioeconomic variables and their definitions. 
 Following Holt and Laury (2002), we present the difference in expected payoffs for each 
scenario (as shown in table 2). There are 35 scenarios grouped into three series. Series 1 
includes scenarios 1–14. Notice that the expected payoff for option A is the same for all 
scenarios, whereas it increases for option B as the scenario number increases. Thus, the 
expected payoff for scenarios 6 and 7 are the same under option A, while it is higher for 
scenario 7 under option B. In series 2 (scenarios 15–28) option B has a higher expected 
payoff than option A throughout. The expected payoff for option B also improves, while it 
remains the same for option A. Series 3 is the last batch (scenarios 29–35) with the same 
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Table 1. Definitions of Socioeconomic Variables 
Variable Name Description 
Age Age of the subject 
Gender Gender of the subject: 1 = male, 0 = female 
Education Number of years the subject attended school 
Acquaintance Ratio Number of other participants the subject knows by name divided by the total 
number of subjects in the session 
Farming/Livestock Binary variable indicating whether subject’s main occupation is farming or raising 
livestock 
Fishing Binary variable indicating whether subject’s main occupation is fishing 
Trade Binary variable indicating whether subject’s main occupation is trading 
Family Business Binary variable indicating whether subject is engaged in household business 
Government Official Binary variable indicating whether the subject works for local government 
Relative Income Subject’s household income divided by mean household income of the village 
Mean Village Income Mean household income of the village (million dong) 
Distance to Market Distance to the nearest local market (km) 
Expenditure/Income Ratio Household expenditure divided by household income per year 
 
pattern of expected payoffs as observed in series 1 and series 2 except there is also a chance 
of losing money. 
 In each series the scenarios are ordered in such a way that option B improves compared to 
option A. To be consistent, the individual will either choose option A for all scenarios or 
switch to option B in some scenario and choose B for all remaining scenarios in the series. 
Series 1 and series 2 are designed to estimate the level of risk aversion, whereas series 3 
addresses the loss-aversion aspect. For each of the three series, the subject may make a switch 
from option A to option B in some scenario. Note also that we provided examples in the 
experiment instructions (see appendix) to illustrate for the participants that it was alright for 
them to choose option A in all scenarios of a given series (i.e., no switching); likewise, they 
could make a switch immediately at the first scenario of the series (choosing option B for 
every scenario in the series). 
 Table 3 reports the distribution of participants by their switching points in series 1, 2, and 
3. As indicated in table 3, there were always some participants making the switch from A to 
B. In addition, some participants never made a switch in a given series. Thus, we can trust the 
participants’ comprehension of the experimental instructions. 
 In the next section a structural model approach is presented to address the correlation 
between parameters of the utility function under the prospect theory framework and socio-
economic variables such as age, gender, occupation, education, and wealth level proxied by 
agricultural land holding. Information on the latter variables was obtained from the 2002 
Vietnam Household Living Standard Survey. 
 
Empirical Specifications 
Following Andersen et al. (2008), we applied the random utility model approach (Train, 
2003) to develop our empirical strategy. Let ;A jiU  be the utility participant i receives from 
option A for scenario j. Only agent i knows the value of ; .A jiU  We don’t observe 
; ,A jiU  but 
rather assume that i’s utility follows prospect theory.  Also, we can observe i’s demographic
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 Table 2. Expected Payoff Difference of Pairwise Lottery Choices 
 
Option A 
 
Option B 
Expected Payoff 
Difference (A − B) 
Series 1 (Scenarios 1–14)   
3/10 of 40,000 and 7/10 of 10,000 1/10 of 68,000 and 9/10 of 5,000 7,700 
3/10 of 40,000 and 7/10 of 10,000 1/10 of 75,000 and 9/10 of 5,000 7,000 
3/10 of 40,000 and 7/10 of 10,000 1/10 of 83,000 and 9/10 of 5,000 6,200 
3/10 of 40,000 and 7/10 of 10,000 1/10 of 93,000 and 9/10 of 5,000 5,200 
3/10 of 40,000 and 7/10 of 10,000 1/10 of 106,000 and 9/10 of 5,000 3,900 
3/10 of 40,000 and 7/10 of 10,000 1/10 of 125,000 and 9/10 of 5,000 2,000 
3/10 of 40,000 and 7/10 of 10,000 1/10 of 150,000 and 9/10 of 5,000 −500 
3/10 of 40,000 and 7/10 of 10,000 1/10 of 185,000 and 9/10 of 5,000 −4,000 
3/10 of 40,000 and 7/10 of 10,000 1/10 of 220,000 and 9/10 of 5,000 −7,500 
3/10 of 40,000 and 7/10 of 10,000 1/10 of 300,000 and 9/10 of 5,000 −15,500 
3/10 of 40,000 and 7/10 of 10,000 1/10 of 400,000 and 9/10 of 5,000 −25,500 
3/10 of 40,000 and 7/10 of 10,000 1/10 of 600,000 and 9/10 of 5,000 −45,500 
3/10 of 40,000 and 7/10 of 10,000 1/10 of 1,000,000 and 9/10 of 5,000 −85,500 
3/10 of 40,000 and 7/10 of 10,000 1/10 of 1,700,000 and 9/10 of 5,000 −155,500 
Series 2 (Scenarios 15–28)   
9/10 of 40,000 and 1/10 of 30,000 7/10 of 54,000 and 3/10 of 5,000 −300 
9/10 of 40,000 and 1/10 of 30,000 7/10 of 56,000 and 3/10 of 5,000 −1,700 
9/10 of 40,000 and 1/10 of 30,000 7/10 of 58,000 and 3/10 of 5,000 −3,100 
9/10 of 40,000 and 1/10 of 30,000 7/10 of 60,000 and 3/10 of 5,000 −4,500 
9/10 of 40,000 and 1/10 of 30,000 7/10 of 62,000 and 3/10 of 5,000 −5,900 
9/10 of 40,000 and 1/10 of 30,000 7/10 of 65,000 and 3/10 of 5,000 −8,000 
9/10 of 40,000 and 1/10 of 30,000 7/10 of 68,000 and 3/10 of 5,000 −10,100 
9/10 of 40,000 and 1/10 of 30,000 7/10 of 72,000 and 3/10 of 5,000 −12,900 
9/10 of 40,000 and 1/10 of 30,000 7/10 of 77,000 and 3/10 of 5,000 −16,400 
9/10 of 40,000 and 1/10 of 30,000 7/10 of 83,000 and 3/10 of 5,000 −20,600 
9/10 of 40,000 and 1/10 of 30,000 7/10 of 90,000 and 3/10 of 5,000 −25,500 
9/10 of 40,000 and 1/10 of 30,000 7/10 of 100,000 and 3/10 of 5,000 −32,500 
9/10 of 40,000 and 1/10 of 30,000 7/10 of 110,000 and 3/10 of 5,000 −39,500 
9/10 of 40,000 and 1/10 of 30,000 7/10 of 130,000 and 3/10 of 5,000 −53,500 
Series 3 (Scenarios 29–35)   
5/10 of 25,000 and 5/10 of −4,000 5/10 of 30,000 and 5/10 of −21,000 6,000 
5/10 of 4,000 and 5/10 of −4,000 5/10 of 30,000 and 5/10 of −21,000 −4,500 
5/10 of 1,000 and 5/10 of −4,000 5/10 of 30,000 and 5/10 of −21,000 −6,000 
5/10 of 1,000 and 5/10 of −4,000 5/10 of 30,000 and 5/10 of −16,000 −8,500 
5/10 of 1,000 and 5/10 of −8,000 5/10 of 30,000 and 5/10 of −16,000 −10,500 
5/10 of 1,000 and 5/10 of −8,000 5/10 of 30,000 and 5/10 of −14,000 −11,500 
5/10 of 1,000 and 5/10 of −8,000 5/10 of 30,000 and 5/10 of −11,000 −13,000 
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Table 3. Number of Subjects by Switching Points 
 Number of Participants Making the Switch 
   Switching Points Series 1 Series 2 Series 3 
  1   9 33 38 
  2   2   4 26 
  3   6   4 27 
  4   6   7 29 
  5   8 14 26 
  6 21   9   6 
  7 28 20   3 
  8 27 19 29 
  9 14 18  
10 14   4  
11 14 10  
12   5   7  
13   1   3  
14   0   3  
            Never 29 29  
            Total 184  184  184  
 
characteristics and information on scenario j, including probabilities and payoffs for options 
A and B. Thus, the relationship between ; ; and A j A ji iU PT can be expressed as follows: 
 
(2)                                       ; ; ;( ;  ) ,A j A j j A ji i i iU PT  X Z  
 
where ;A jiPT  is the utility under prospect theory defined in (1) that agent i receives from 
option A for scenario j, Xi is a vector of participant i’s demographic characteristics such as 
age, education, and gender; Zi is information on scenario j including probabilities and payoffs 
for options A and B; and ;A ji  is the error term which captures either misspecification in the 
functional form of PT or unobserved characteristics of agent i. By standard convention, we 
also assume that ; ; ;1 2{ , , ..., }
A j A j A j
N    are independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) and 
follow a normal distribution. The joint density of this distribution is denoted as f (ε). 
 Likewise, we can define the relationship between ; ; and B j B ji iU PT as: 
 
(3)                                       ; ; ;( ;  ) .B j B j j B ji i i iU PT  X Z  
 
 Given scenario j, using (2) and (3), the probability that option A is chosen can be expressed 
as: 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
; ; ; ;
; ; ; ;
; ;
Pr ( ) Pr ( ;  ) ( ;  ) 0
Pr ( ) Pr ( ;  ) ( ;  )
Pr ( ) ( ;  ) ( ;  ) ,
A j j A j B j j B j
i i i i i i
A j j B j j B j A j
i i i i i i
A j j B j j
i i i i
A PT PT
A PT PT
A PT PT
      
      
  
X Z X Z
X Z X Z
X Z X Z
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where 
( ) ( )x f d      
is the cumulative distribution of the error term . 
 Next, we define the latent index for option A given scenario j as follows:  
; ; ; .A j A j B ji i iΙ PT PT   
Similarly, the latent index for option B is defined as:  
; ; ; .B j B j A ji i iI PT PT   
We can then write Pr (A) = Ф( ;A jiI ) and Pr (B) = Ф( ;B jiI ). 
 To apply the maximum log-likelihood estimation technique, we note that the conditional 
log likelihood for each individual depends on the utility function parameters (α, λ, γ) under 
prospect theory as well as the observed choices. More specifically, the conditional log likeli-
hood for participant i can be written as: 
(4)      
35
; ;
j=1
ln L ( , , ; , , ) ln ( ) | =1  + ln ( ) | = 0{[ ] [ ]},i j j A j j B j ji i i i iy I y I y     X Z
 
where =1jiy  when individual i chooses option A in scenario j; similarly, =0
j
iy  when indi-
vidual i chooses option B in scenario j. X is a vector of individual i’s characteristics. 
 To address the correlation between the parameters (, λ, γ) and demographic variables, we 
allow each of the former to be a linear function of the latter as follows: 
0
0
,
,
F F
F F
      
        
X X
X X
 
where XF is a vector of binary variables indicating whether the individual is a fisherman; X is 
a vector of other socioeconomic and demographic variables including age, education, distance 
to market, savings, agricultural land ownership, and membership in a ROSCA;3 η and  are 
the error terms which are assumed to be i.i.d. and uncorrelated (Cov(η, ) = 0). 
 The joint likelihood for all individuals can then be represented by: 
(5)          
1
35
; ;
1 =1
L( , , ; , ) ln L ( , , ; , )
ln ( ) | =1 + ln ( ) | = 0 .[ ] [ ]{ }
N
i j j
i
i
N
A j j B j j
i i i i
i j
y y
I y I y


      
  


X X Z  
The maximum-likelihood estimation for (, λ, γ) is therefore: 
   ˆˆ ˆ, , arg max L , , ; , .y       X  
 
                                                 
3 ROSCA is also known as rotating savings and credit associations, which are informal credit institutions and very popular in a 
number of developing countries. 
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 We develop a maximum-likelihood procedure in STATA to estimate the correlation of , 
λ, and γ with other socioeconomic variables based on (5). It is worth noting that we can 
derive (5) under the assumption that the error terms for each individual are independent 
across scenarios. A more realistic assumption would be to allow for some correlation between 
these error terms. In that case, a cross-sectional time-series approach would be more 
appropriate. One can then apply the simulated maximum-likelihood technique (Train, 2003) 
to estimate (α, λ, γ). However, this approach requires a great deal of computational power.4 
Instead, we applied the standard maximum-likelihood procedure using the cluster option in 
STATA, which takes into account arbitrary intra-group correlation. 
 Prior to conducting the econometric analysis, we address an important consideration in this 
type of study: direction of causality. The key research question is whether being involved in 
fishing makes fishermen less risk averse. In other words, we are interested in whether the 
estimated coefficient γ is significantly negative. However, the causality may go in both 
directions. A number of studies in labor economics have shown that less risk-averse agents 
are more likely to choose a riskier job for better compensation (Viscusi and Hersch, 2001). 
For example, King (1974) found that individuals from wealthier families tend to choose 
riskier occupations. Cramer et al. (2002) showed that less risk-averse agents are attracted to 
becoming entrepreneurs, which is a risky occupation choice. 
 It could be that working in fishing makes people more accustomed to taking risks. But, it 
could also be the case that less risk-averse people would choose a risky occupation, such as 
fishing, to suit their preferences. Fortunately, this ambiguous direction of causality is some-
what resolved in the context of our study. As mentioned above, Vietnam’s fishermen possess 
a unique characteristic in the sense that fishing is mostly a traditional occupation concentrated 
in certain areas. People, especially men from those areas, almost automatically become fisher-
men when they reach adulthood—as fishing is considered the only available occupation option 
for most men in these fishing villages. 
 This unique characteristic of Vietnam’s fishermen provides us with a great advantage in 
studying the causal relationship between working in fishing and risk behavior. A related 
concern here is that individuals can avoid becoming fishermen by moving away from the 
villages. While this may be somewhat true, it is important to note that occurrences of migra-
tion and job mobility in Vietnam are very low compared to developed countries. This was 
especially true before Vietnam’s economic reform policy in 1986, during which time migra-
tion from one province to another was strictly monitored by the government. Many fishermen 
in our study (74%) started their career during that time. 
 
Main Findings 
First, we investigate the descriptive statistics of key variables used in the analysis. As can be 
seen from table 4, the majority of participants work in the farming sector. The mean years of 
schooling is around seven years. This relatively high educational level is a crucial factor that 
ensures the participants’ comprehension of the experiments (Tanaka, Camerer, and Nguyen, 
forthcoming). There are notable differences between participants from villages in the North 
and those in the South in a number of respects. Southern participants are wealthier. 
The proportion of participants who work in fishing is also greater in the South.  People in the
                                                 
4 For instance, Andersen et al. (2008), in a complementary document to their paper in Econometrica, stated that it may take four 
days to run the simulated maximum likelihood. 
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Table 4. Basic Descriptive Statistics of Main Variables 
Variable Total North South 
Number of Experiment Participants 184 84 100 
Mean Household Income (106 VND) 
 Mean 
 Standard Deviation  
 
20.23 
10.04 
 
14.65 
  7.95 
 
24.95 
  9.20 
Age 
 Mean 
 Standard Deviation 
 
47.45 
12.04 
 
48.54 
13.42 
 
46.53 
12.39 
Gender (1 = male)   0.61   0.45   0.75 
Education 
 Mean 
 Standard Deviation 
 
  6.74 
  3.84 
 
  6.91 
  3.79 
 
  6.60 
  3.88 
Main Occupation (%):    
 Farming and Livestock 46.17 49.08 43.71 
 Fishing 14.70   4.86 22.96 
 Trade   7.22   8.75   5.95 
 Family Business   5.87   6.40   5.42 
 Government Official 10.59 12.61   8.90 
 Casual and Unemployed 15.44 18.25 13.05 
Distance to Nearest Market (km)   1.48   1.19   1.72 
Agricultural Land Holding (m2) 3,175 1,647.6 4,481.4 
 
South hold more land. On the other hand, there is a greater proportion of participants in the 
North working for the government. Given these differences between the North and South, we 
use a binary variable in subsequent regression analyses to indicate whether the participant is 
from the South or the North. 
 The curvature of the utility function (), the loss-aversion parameter (λ). and the proba-
bility weighting function parameter (γ) were estimated against demographic variables using 
the structural model approach described above. The main results are reported in table 5. We 
first examine the determinants of , which serves as a proxy for risk aversion. A positive 
value of the coefficient implies that the corresponding variable has a negative impact on risk-
aversion level, or the greater this variable is, the less risk averse the participant. The most 
interesting finding is that working in fishing makes the participants less risk averse than 
casual workers and unemployed individuals (the reference category). We also compared the 
coefficient for the fishermen variable with those of other occupation variables and found the 
coefficient for fishermen to be significantly higher. This result suggests participants in occu-
pations involving high risk such as fishing might be more willing to take risks, though fisher-
men are not necessarily more risk preferring than individuals in other occupations (Smith and 
Wilen, 2005). 
 Other factors having a significant impact on the risk-aversion level include gender, family 
business, ROSCA membership, amount of agricultural land owned, and distance to market. 
Interestingly, men are found to be more averse to risk than women. This finding challenges 
the common belief that men are more willing to assume risk than women. Individuals running 
family businesses are more willing to take risk. Land ownership, which is a proxy for wealth, 
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Table 5. Correlation of Utility’s Parameters Under Prospect Theory with Socioeconomic 
Variables Using a Structural Model Approach 
 Risk Aversion () Loss Aversion (λ) Probability Weighting (γ) 
 
Variable 
 
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
 
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
 
Coefficient 
Standard 
Error 
Age −0.003 0.002 0.075** 0.034 0.008 0.006 
Gender (1 = male) −0.157*** 0.057 −9.470*** 2.475 −0.031 0.104 
Education −0.003 0.012 −0.309*** 0.105 0.038 0.023 
Fishermen 3.794*** 0.532 0.655 1.022 −3.824*** 0.530 
Farmers −0.118 0.115 −14.840*** 3.261 −0.344 0.232 
Sales/Trade 0.082 0.111 24.117*** 5.168 0.041 0.170 
Family Business 0.990*** 0.326 −4.271*** 1.502 −0.741** 0.356 
Government Official 0.095 0.081 0.233 1.793 −0.061 0.160 
Distance to Market −0.110*** 0.024 6.236*** 1.330 0.123*** 0.033 
ROSCA Member 0.415*** 0.117 −1.791 1.638 −0.404** 0.167 
Bidding ROSCA Member −0.169 0.122 11.852*** 3.048 0.487* 0.256 
South 0.025 0.081 27.432*** 5.454 −0.092 0.142 
Log(Savings) −0.022** 0.011 −0.666*** 0.206 0.032** 0.015 
Ag Land Holding 4.6e-06*** 1.6e-06 0.002*** 0.001 −2.3e-08 6.3e-06 
Constant 0.586*** 0.216 1.200** 0.470 −0.491 0.303 
No. of Observations =  6,440 
Pseudo-Log Likelihood  =  −4,166 
    
Notes: Single, double, and triple asterisks (*,**,***) denote p < 0.10, 0.05, and 0.01, respectively. We conducted robust 
regressions, and adjusted standard errors for correlations within individuals. 
 
is also found to have a negative effect on risk aversion. One explanation is that the response 
to a change in income may be different between the rich and the poor. The same variation in 
harvesting revenue may be perceived as negligible for the wealthy, while it may have a 
substantial impact on poorer families. Regarding the effect of distance to market on risk 
aversion, the closer the participant lives to the market, the less risk averse she is. It could be 
that living close to the market exposes the participant to the daily uncertainties of business 
activities, therefore acclimating her to income fluctuation. ROSCA members are less averse 
to risk than non-ROSCA members. The higher willingness to take risk among ROSCA 
members may relate to the risky decision on joining a ROSCA given the possibility of losing 
money as a result of potential default. 
 With respect to loss aversion, the coefficient for the constant is 1.2, and the corresponding 
95% confidence interval is [0.3, 2.1] which includes 1 but does not include 0. Accordingly, 
there is some evidence of loss aversion in our sample. Farmers and people who run family 
businesses are found to be more averse to loss, as are people who save more. Individuals who 
are involved in sales and trade activities are less loss averse, as are people who own more 
agricultural land. The relationship between land holding and loss aversion is consistent with 
results reported by Tanaka, Camerer, and Nguyen (forthcoming), who found that higher 
income participants are less averse to loss than others. Members of bidding ROSCAs are less 
averse to loss than non-ROSCA members. No significant difference is found between fisher-
men and the reference group.  
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  Figure 2. Probability weighting function 
 
 In examining the correlation between the probability weighting function parameter (γ) and 
other socioeconomic variables, fishermen appear to underweight probabilities. Likewise, 
people who run family businesses and members of ROSCAs are found to have inflected prob-
ability weightings and thus respond less to probability information and, possibly, stronger 
outcome orientation. In contrast, those who live close to the market and those with greater 
savings are more inclined to overweight favorable probabilities. 
 
Discussion 
 
A key significant finding in this study is that fishermen are less risk averse than people in 
other occupations (farmers, trade/sales people, government officials) and the unemployed. A 
natural question emerges: To what extent can we say that being involved in fishing makes 
fishers have different risk preferences? It may also be that fishing attracts people with a 
certain type of preferences. The causal relationship between preferences and occupational 
choice is still an open question. We prefer the balanced view that preferences are both biolog-
ically and environmentally influenced. Quoting Strotz (1956, p. 177): “My own supposition is 
that most of us are ‘born’ with discount functions . . . [but that] true discount functions 
become sublimated by parental teaching and social pressure.” Being faced with uncertainty 
on an almost daily basis perhaps makes fishermen less averse to risk, possibly explaining 
their different weighting probability. 
 Fishermen also have more inflected probability weightings (lower γ). Wu and Gonzalez 
(1996) point out that γ reflects a person’s responsiveness to changes in probability. Intuitively, 
we can view γ as a winning gamble’s attractiveness. A lower γ implies fishermen are less 
disposed to gamble. Specifically, the more inflected the probability weighting curve, the 
lower are the weights placed on the probabilities. In this sense, one person finds a gamble less 
attractive than does another individual if she places less weight on the (larger outcome’s) 
probability. The elevation of the curve also determines where the curve intersects the 
diagonal, i.e., the linear probability weighting line in (p, w(p)) space. As can be seen from 
figure 2, the lower the point of intersection with the diagonal, the smaller the range of 
probabilities where the subject displays optimism (w(p) > p). 
 While we don’t have a definite explanation for this finding, the framework of bounded 
rationality provides some interesting insights (Fehr-Duda, de Gennaro, and Schubert, 2005). 
Following this framework, fishermen have to make many small (but occasionally some big) 
financial decisions whose probabilities of outcomes are usually not well-defined numbers, but 
p
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are instead ambiguous. It is possible that fishermen have adapted to their unique environment 
by using specific heuristics for decision making under conditions of uncertainty. When 
confronted with purely risky decisions which we imitate in the experiment, fishermen may be 
drawn more strongly to their rules for ambiguous situations which result in a lower respon-
siveness to probability information and, possibly, stronger outcome orientation. We believe a 
focus on occupation-specific heuristics is an exciting direction for future research. 
 
Conclusions 
Prospect theory has been applied to investigate whether working in fishing makes fishermen 
less averse to risk than others. Our findings reveal that working in fishing does make the 
participants less averse to risk. Fishermen also tend to be less sensitive to probability changes. 
The result is highly significant. The combination of experimental field data and household 
survey data plays an important role in the investigation process. Also, the unique charac-
teristic of Vietnamese fishermen, who consider fishing as their only occupational choice, 
makes it possible to infer the causal relationship between fishing occupation and the resulting 
risk behavior. 
 An interesting aspect of our study is that we applied a structural model approach to 
estimate the correlation between parameters of the utility function under prospect theory with 
other demographic variables. More specifically, we developed a maximum-likelihood estima-
tion procedure using inputs from the binary choice made by participants in the experiment 
and their corresponding socioeconomic characteristics collected from a household survey. 
 Several policy implications benefited from the finding that fishermen are less risk averse 
than others. First, fishery closure is a matter of debate among policy makers as they attempt to 
balance the fishermen’s economic well-being with the need for biological preservation. 
Fisheries managers are concerned that fishermen would rather prefer less variation in revenue 
that may come as a result of fisheries closures, and the need for fishermen to relocate to other 
fishing grounds. The finding in this paper shows that fishermen are not so much averse to 
income variation, but rather to income loss. Thus, a more relevant question is how closures 
may lead to a reduction in fishing revenue, as fishermen are just as loss averse in terms of 
revenue as people of other occupations. Second, a number of programs that aim to help the 
poor in developing countries, such as the World Bank-initiated microfinance programs, 
assume fishermen are risk averse. Under this assumption, programs are being developed that 
implement risk-sharing mechanisms to encourage more risky investment behavior. According 
to our findings, a more effective program would seek to develop a safety net to protect 
fishermen in the event of an economic loss. 
 Results of this study suggest a potential for extension of our research. As observed from 
table 4, the majority of respondents report farming and livestock as their main occupations. 
Yet, a much lower proportion of participants, especially those in the North, claim fishing as 
their main occupation.5 Our research primarily addresses variation in risk attitudes among 
people involved in different occupations, with farmers comprising the largest group 
represented. Most fishermen and other workers in our data take farming as a secondary job, 
although we don’t have the data to confirm this. In other words, our sample group may 
be considered to be composed of agriculturists, some of whom also fish. The effect of risk 
attitude on being a fisherman may be linked simultaneously with the effect of being a farmer. 
                                                 
5 We thank the editor for this insight. 
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An interesting future research question is how to estimate the net effect of fishing on risk 
attitude for a fisherman having multiple jobs by controlling for the number of years the 
fisherman has been working in fisheries. 
 There remain areas for improvement relating to the potential endogeneity in the models. 
For instance, working in the business sector may affect risk behavior. On the other hand, 
people with certain risk behaviors may choose business as an occupation. In the context of 
cross-sectional data like ours, it is not possible to solve all the endogeneity problems. Future 
research can more clearly establish the causal relationships between risk behavior and other 
variables by employing panel data or randomized field experiments (Tanaka, Camerer, and 
Nguyen, forthcoming). 
 Our study shows that new research methodologies can be integrated into the study of labor 
economics. Field experiment and household data can be combined and can complement each 
other. In addition to expected utility theory, prospect theory can also provide insights into risk 
behavior. The methodology developed here is applicable to a broad spectrum of research, 
both within fishing and in other fields as well. 
 
[Received January 2009; final revision received October 2009.] 
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Appendix: 
Experiment Design and Sample Record Sheets 
 
Instructions to Experiment Participants 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
In this game, your earnings will depend partly on your decisions and partly on chance. 
There are 3 series of questions. Series 1 consists of 14 questions. Series 2 consists of 14 
questions, and Series 3 consists of 7 questions. So, there are 35 questions in total. In each 
question, we will offer you two options: Option A and Option B. We would like you to 
choose either Option A or Option B for each question. After you complete the record sheet, 
we will place 35 balls in a bingo cage and draw one numbered ball to select 1 question out 
of the 35 questions. We will play the selected question for real money. For example, if the 
number 21 ball is drawn, we will play Question 21 for real money. Once the question is 
determined, we will place 10 balls in the cage and play the selected question. 
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RECORD SHEET, Game 2: Series 1 
 Option A Option B 
1  40,000VND if  
 10,000 VND if  
 68,000VND if  
 5,000 VND if  
   
2  40,000VND if  
 10,000 VND if  
 75,000VND if  
 5,000 VND if  
   
3  40,000VND if  
 10,000 VND if  
 83,000VND if  
 5,000 VND if  
   
4  40,000VND if  
 10,000 VND if  
 93,000VND if  
 5,000 VND if  
   
5  40,000VND if  
 10,000 VND if  
 106,500VND if  
 5,000 VND if  
   
6  40,000VND if  
 10,000 VND if  
 125,000VND if  
 5,000 VND if  
   
7  40,000VND if  
 10,000 VND if  
 150,000VND if  
 5,000 VND if  
   
8  40,000VND if  
 10,000 VND if  
 185,000VND if  
 5,000 VND if  
   
9  40,000VND if  
 10,000 VND if  
 220,000VND if  
 5,000 VND if  
   
10  40,000VND if  
 10,000 VND if  
 300,000VND if  
 5,000 VND if  
   
11  40,000VND if  
 10,000 VND if  
 400,000VND if  
 5,000 VND if  
   
12  40,000VND if  
 10,000 VND if  
 600,000VND if  
 5,000 VND if  
   
13  40,000VND if  
 10,000 VND if  
 1,000,000VND if  
 5,000 VND if  
   
14  40,000VND if  
 10,000 VND if  
 1,700,000VND if  
 5,000 VND if  
 
Answer: 
 I choose Option A for Questions 1 – [       ] 
 I choose Option B for Questions [       ]  – 14  
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RECORD SHEET, Game 2: Series 2 
 Option A Option B 
15  40,000VND if  
 30,000 VND if  
 54,000VND if  
 5,000 VND if  
   
16  40,000VND if  
 30,000 VND if  
 56,000VND if  
 5,000 VND if  
   
17  40,000VND if  
 30,000 VND if  
 58,000VND if  
 5,000 VND if  
   
18  40,000VND if  
 30,000 VND if  
 60,000VND if  
 5,000 VND if  
   
19  40,000VND if  
 30,000 VND if  
 62,000VND if  
 5,000 VND if  
   
20  40,000VND if  
 30,000 VND if  
 65,000VND if  
 5,000 VND if  
   
21  40,000VND if  
 30,000 VND if  
 68,000VND if  
 5,000 VND if  
   
22  40,000VND if  
 30,000 VND if  
 72,000VND if  
 5,000 VND if  
   
23  40,000VND if  
 30,000 VND if 
 77,000VND if  
 5,000 VND if  
   
24  40,000VND if  
 30,000 VND if  
 83,000VND if  
 5,000 VND if  
   
25  40,000VND if  
 30,000 VND if  
 90,000VND if  
 5,000 VND if  
   
26  40,000VND if  
 30,000 VND if  
 100,000VND if  
 5,000 VND if  
   
27  40,000VND if  
 30,000 VND if  
 110,000VND if  
 5,000 VND if  
   
28  40,000VND if  
 30,000 VND if  
 130,000VND if  
 5,000 VND if  
 
Answer: 
 I choose Option A for Questions 15 – [       ] 
 I choose Option B for Questions [       ]  – 28  
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RECORD SHEET, Game 2: Series 3 
 Option A Option B 
29 Receive 25,000VND if  
Lose 4,000 VND if  
Receive 30,000VND if  
Lose 21,000 VND if  
   
30 Receive 4,000VND if  
Lose 4,000 VND if  
Receive 30,000VND if  
Lose 21,000 VND if  
   
31 Receive 1,000VND if  
Lose 4,000 VND if  
Receive 30,000VND if  
Lose 21,000 VND if  
   
32 Receive 1,000VND if  
Lose 4,000 VND if  
Receive 30,000VND if  
Lose 16,000 VND if  
   
33 Receive 1,000VND if  
Lose 8,000 VND if  
Receive 30,000VND if  
Lose 16,000 VND if  
   
34 Receive 1,000VND if  
Lose 8,000 VND if  
Receive 30,000VND if  
Lose 14,000 VND if  
   
35 Receive 1,000VND if  
Lose 8,000 VND if  
Receive 30,000VND if  
Lose 11,000 VND if  
 
Answer: 
 I choose Option A for Questions 29 – [       ]  
 I choose Option B for Questions [       ]  – 35 
 
 
